Research Archives - Centre for Future Work

Extending Gas Tax Holiday Won’t Fix Fossil Fuel Inflation

Jim Stanford — Wed, 02 Sep 2026 19:56:47 +0000

The federal government has announced it will extend the current holiday on the federal excise tax on gasoline and diesel fuel for another 4 months, until January 31, 2027. New research from the Centre for Future Work confirms that extension will not solve the underlying problem of oil-fueled inflation that is hurting all Canadians, not just drivers.

The tax holiday first came into effect on April 20, and was originally set to end on Labour Day. It was intended to offset some of the impact of rising oil prices (resulting from the U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz) on Canadian consumers.

While the tax holiday may be appreciated by drivers, it has not addressed the underlying inflationary shock arising from this latest global oil price shock. In fact, Canadian gasoline and diesel prices are higher now than they were before the tax holiday came into effect (and have been higher through most of the 18 weeks since it began). The full value of the tax holiday (to fuel consumers) has thus been more than offset by continued increases in the cost of petroleum products.

New national income data released last week by Statistics Canada confirms Canadian consumers are paying billions of dollars extra for petroleum products despite the cushion from the excise tax holiday. There are also signs that the price shock is spreading into other products beyond petroleum, including air travel, other transportation, and food. This raises the spectre of another spike in broader inflation, sparked by petroleum prices. Statistics Canada data also confirms the petroleum industry in Canada has received record profits as a result of the current oil price shock.

The Centre for Future Work has published a new briefing paper analyzing the latest Statistics Canada data on consumer costs, average prices, and petroleum profits. Highlights include:

There was a large increase in consumer expenses for petroleum products, despite the tax holiday. This includes $3 billion in extra consumer costs for motor vehicle fuels in just three months April through June).
There is a growing gap (called the ‘crack spread’) between prices of gasoline and diesel, and underlying prices for crude oil. This has exacerbated the impact of the oil price shock on Canadian consumers.
There are some early signs of spillover from higher petroleum prices into other prices, and hence into broader inflation – enhancing the risk of future interest rate increases.
The price shock has produced a dramatic increase in profitability for the Canadian petroleum industry, a direct result of the extra costs paid by consumers. Combined after-tax profit in the upstream and downstream sectors reached $23 billion in the second-quarter, more than double their profits in the first quarter.
But just 5% of additional profits, and 2% of additional revenues, have been reinvested by the industry in new capital spending.

The paper concludes with several policy recommendations regarding how Canada can better protect itself against repeated cycles of oil-fired inflation, affordability crises, and higher interest rates.

Please see the full briefing paper, Another Band-aid: Extending Gas Tax Holiday Won’t Fix Fossil Fuel Inflation, by Jim Stanford.

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Workforce Alliances an Opportunity for Canadian Unions to Shape Future Industrial Strategies

Jim Stanford — Thu, 27 Aug 2026 06:50:25 +0000

A new report co-published by the Centre for Future Work and the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives reviews six new ‘Workforce Alliances’ being established by the federal government as part of its economic strategy responding to Donald Trump’s trade war. The report concludes that the Alliances have potential to improve training, labour supply, and labour standards – but Canadian unions must be ambitious and assertive to ensure that they fulfil this potential.

The report, Hinge Moment for Canada’s Workforce and Industrial Policy, is based on research presented at the recent Canadian Industrial Relations Association conference at Université Laval in Québec.

The federal government is advancing these new Alliances to strengthen the labour side of major new investment and industrial policies. Somewhat reminiscent of the previous tripartite era of sector councils from the 1990s, unions are once again being invited to participate.

Ottawa has announced six Workforce Alliances, which largely mirror the government’s industry, energy and transportation infrastructure initiatives. On a parallel track, a historic $6 billion funding stream to support Red Seal skilled trades training has also been launched.

Unions have ample experience with supply-side training programs. Too many have focused solely on meeting the labour supply needs of employers, with limited benefits for workers and no opportunity to build union power. Could this iteration of workforce policy be an opportunity for the labour movement to do better? Does it create an opening to influence industrial policy, labour standards and worker rights?

At a special panel during the 2026 conference of the Canadian Industrial Relations Association (CIRA) at Université Laval in June, union experts and labour studies academics came together to review the Workforce Alliances and their associated training initiatives, and examine the opportunities for genuine trade union engagement.

The presentations to the CIRA conference are collected in this compendium. The goal is to start a bigger discussion among trade unionists and progressive researchers about a labour strategy that links workforce policy with labour standards and conditionalities across the industries and sectors receiving federal funding, including a larger role for unions in shaping industrial policy.

Several common themes emerge from the contributions collected here. First, workforce policy cannot be reduced to labour supply measures aimed solely at meeting employers’ skills needs. Second, sectoral institutions and public investments must be linked to stronger labour standards, worker retention and equitable employment outcomes. Finally, the Workforce Alliances raise broader questions about industrial governance and whether unions can use these new institutions to exercise meaningful influence over economic strategy and democratic decision-making.

Fred Wilson’s introduction traces the evolution of workforce policies from the old sector councils, to industry-led labour market information programs and now back to partial joint governance in the Workforce Alliances. In each case, the primary purpose has been to provide “labour market information,” or LMI, and training programs to meet employer needs. Yet, in this latest version of workforce policy, to meet the government’s promise of “not just jobs, but careers” will require going well beyond the LMI model. Labour’s goals in the new workforce policies must address sector and industry-based standards and industrial policies that create and sustain high-quality, value-added jobs.

Ken Delaney, the managing director of the Canadian Skilled Trades Employment Coalition (CSTEC), Canada’s longest-standing “sector council” model, speaks to the limits of the former sector councils that were confined by government agendas. CSTEC’s work highlights the promise of workforce programs to address worker transition, equity and inclusion, especially if workers are allowed to maintain EI benefits in training. The organization’s programs also demonstrate how the career-building potential of Red Seal training can be adapted to meet the needs of skilled workers in manufacturing and other sectors. Delaney encourages unions to seize the opportunity in the Workforce Alliances to integrate industrial policy with labour market policy.

Professor Evelyn Dionne’s study of the construction sector in Quebec warns that sector programs to increase labour force supply and speed up construction can lead to “a downward spiral marked by declining skill levels, lower-quality housing, inefficient green buildings and high turnover.” Dionne calls for project labour agreements (PLAs) to be incorporated into housing and construction projects in order to establish common and high-quality terms and conditions governing all workers and contractors. “By embedding training, equity and labour standards into procurement processes,” she writes, “PLAs can help ensure that accelerated construction does not come at the expense of quality or working conditions.”

After pressure from within the Liberal caucus, reinforced by advocacy from social policy and feminist advocates, the federal government agreed to establish a Workforce Alliance for the care economy. Laurell Ritchie, a member of the Care Economy Initiative, emphasizes that in the care economy, worker retention is as important as recruitment. Like industrial sectors, meeting workforce goals in the care economy will require sector-based programs and standards, and strong government leadership. The inclusion of the care economy among the Workforce Alliances is itself recognition that industry and workforce policy can be influenced by advocacy from unions and women’s organizations.

Unifor Research Director Angelo DiCaro’s contribution on the interrelationship between industrial policy and workforce policy underscores the need for the state to act as a “conductor” of a complex orchestra involving multiple public and private players. A weak state role leaves the government as a passive enabler of the private sector, resulting in “industrial improvisation” rather than industrial strategy. For the Workforce Alliances to make a real difference, they must go beyond workforce development—filling vacancies, and sponsoring training—to become well-rounded tables for “peak-level social dialogue” with “a whole-of-supply-chain approach” to labour standards and industrial growth.

As DiCaro aptly puts it, the Workforce Alliances could be “a vital cog in the wheel of industrial growth and rising workplace standards.” Alternatively, they could become an “unambitious and burdensome exercise, simply facilitating training fund transfers, and entirely delinked from future-facing industrial strategy.”

Prime Minister Carney has described this as a “hinge moment” for Canada, as Canadians collectively face up to the unprecedented threat posed by Donald Trump and aggression from Washington. It is also a hinge moment for labour. The potential reorientation of Canada’s economy away from deep dependence on U.S. export markets, with a greater role for active industrial policy and public investment, carries both opportunities and risks for unions and the workers they represent.

The Workforce Alliances are an opportunity for unions to shape this historic economic moment, leveraging workers’ position at the point of production to demand both material progress and democratic power as this pivot unfolds. Canada’s unions must demonstrate that they have the organizational capacity and political leverage to bring a working-class agenda to the Workforce Alliances, and help to shape this new era of industrial policy in favour of workers.

Please see the full paper here.

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Health Care is an Economic Engine, not Just a Cost Item

Jim Stanford — Mon, 10 Aug 2026 18:56:42 +0000

Canada’s public health care system, which provides essential health services without regard to ability to pay, is one of our most cherished social achievements. Indeed, public opinion polls consistently show that medicare is the single feature Canadians most associate with our national identity. Support for universal public health care is thus an important element of Canadians’ response to the challenges to our economy and sovereignty posed by U.S. President Donald Trump.

However, the medicare system is under threat from inadequate funding, long wait times for some services, and ongoing pressure from investors to privatize services. In Alberta, new laws allow parallel private provision of key health care services (including diagnostic tests and some surgeries). Other provinces (such as Ontario) are also pushing privatization. Always underlying privatization efforts is the claim that Canada simply cannot ‘afford’ the big costs of the public health care system.

At the recent summit meeting of Canadian premiers held in Charlottetown, P.E.I. in July, premiers discussed the challenges of financing health care and called on the federal government to hold a national summit on future health funding. At the summit, Centre for Future Work Director Jim Stanford made a presentation to the premiers on the economic benefits of public health care. He stressed that health care ranks as one of the most important industries in Canada: it creates jobs, generates incomes, supports widespread economic spillovers, and is one of Canada’s leading sources of innovation and new technology. These benefits have to be considered alongside the costs of providing essential health services.

Here is the presentation which Stanford gave to the premiers. It drew on findings from a recent report Stanford prepared for the Canadian Federation of Nurses’ Unions, titled The Economic Benefits of Canada’s Public Health Care System. The report quantified the important ways in which public health care supports employment, incomes, economic growth, and government revenues. Seen this way, health care should be redefined as an investment—not just a cost item on provincial budgets.

Key findings from the report include:

Health care is one of Canada’s largest and most dynamic industries.
It employs 1.9 million waged or salaried employees, and hundreds of thousands more self-employed practitioners, specialists, and contractors.
Health care production accounts for about 8% of Canada’s total value-added (GDP), and over 10% of total employment.
Health care workers earn $120 billion per year in wages and salaries.
The health care system purchases $51 billion worth of supplies and inputs from a complex and far-reaching supply chain (composed mostly of private businesses).
Health care accounts for over $7 billion in annual research spending, the second highest of any Canadian industry.
Because health care is not highly integrated in international trade, it is relatively protected from global disruptions and shocks (like the effects of U.S. trade policies).
Universal access to quality health care unlocks many other economic benefits including: more flexible labour markets (workers are able to change jobs without fear of losing health coverage), enhanced longevity and well-being (supporting more labour force participation and higher productivity), and improved ‘social capital’ (safe and inclusive communities where interactions can occur more securely and efficiently).

In sum, health care cannot be understood solely as a ‘cost.’ It is also a powerful economic engine: a source of growth, jobs, incomes, tax revenues, and well-being. Understanding and appreciating the economic benefits of the universal public health care system can reinforce public and fiscal support for its maintenance and improvement.

Please see the full report here.

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Iran War, Soaring Prices Drive Record Oil Profits

Jim Stanford — Thu, 06 Aug 2026 20:20:42 +0000

U.S. President Donald Trump’s misguided war against Iran has caused another shock in global oil prices – the 14^th such shock in the last half-century. World oil prices rose 50% or more after the war started, and have stayed high despite Trump’s repeated promises to stop the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. These price increases are is driving massive increases in profits for petroleum companies around the world – including Canada.

Canada produces three times more oil than it consumes. And while Canada imports small amounts of oil to the eastern provinces, almost none of that is sourced from the Persian Gulf. Hence there is no significant impact of the war on our domestic supply volumes or costs.

Nevertheless, because of a policy choice to tie domestic oil and petroleum product prices to global benchmarks (allowing oil producers to charge Canadians world prices for their own oil, on pain of diverting supply to more lucrative foreign markets), Canadian petroleum prices have soared in tandem.

The combination of sky-high prices with stable production costs is producing a profit windfall for Canadian petroleum companies. This is confirmed by the recent release of financial reports by publicly-traded Canadian oil companies for the second quarter of 2026.

The table below summarizes after-tax earnings and other metrics for the four largest publicly-traded Canadian producers. Their combined revenues (net of royalty payments) grew almost 50% in the April-June period, compared to the year-earlier period, thanks to the effect of Trump’s war on world prices.

After-tax profits rose more dramatically, since production costs remained largely unchanged. After-tax profits at the big four more than doubled: rising 144% compared to the second quarter of 2025, reaching a combined total of $13.3 billion. That’s almost $150 million per day in after-tax profit over the three-month period.

These four companies represent only a portion of the Canadian petroleum sector. Financial results for many companies (including wholly-owned subsidiaries of foreign oil companies) are never publicly reported. However, Statistics Canada publishes helpful financial data on an industry-wide basis. That data for the second quarter of 2026 will be released later in August.

Extrapolated to apply to the broad Canadian petroleum sector (upstream and downstream), the big four’s results suggest that second-quarter industry-wide profits could reach $30 billion (up from $12.6 billion in the second quarter of 2025). Canadian oil profits for the full year could reach $100 billion. That would set a new all-time record, smashing the peak $68 billion after-tax profit the industry recorded in 2022 (when oil prices were similarly shocked following the Russian invasion of Ukraine).

What are the oil companies doing with this record profit flow? There is no robust pattern of reinvestment in new Canadian projects. In fact, excluding acquisitions of other companies and properties (which does not represent an increase in real investment), capital spending by the big four companies actually declined slightly in the second quarter (compared to the year earlier period).

Instead, their main priority is to pay out so-called “excess cash” to company owners, in the form of increased dividend payments and share buy-back programs. Companies buy back their shares as a way of boosting share prices (this benefits company executives, too, through share-based compensation systems). The four majors spent over $6 billion on share purchases and dividend payments in the second quarter, up by almost $2 billion from like period 2026.

Hopes that booming oil profits will lead to new investment and jobs in the petroleum sector are being dashed by the priority these firms are placing on cash payouts, rather than reinvestments.

But the combination of record profits and rapid share buybacks has been great for company owners. Share prices at the big four majors have increased by an average of 45% since the start of the year. Most of those gains are captured by the wealthiest minority of the population. Other Canadians experience only higher costs and declining real incomes.

Research on the distribution of global oil profits during the 2022 price spike confirms that each oil shock further redistributes income upward. Global oil profits almost doubled that year, to nearly $1 trillion (U.S.). In the U.S., 50% of those gains were received by the richest 1% of the population; the bottom 50% of the population got almost none. A less extreme, but similar, pattern prevails in Canada.

In the meantime, oil-fueled inflation remains a threat to living standards and economic performance for most Canadians – those who do not own significant equity holdings in oil companies. Inflation has increased again in Canada since the Iran war started (just as it did in 2022 after the oil shock accompanying the invasion of Ukraine).

Spillover price increases for other goods and services (whose costs of production also increase due to high petroleum prices) will amplify inflationary pressures. And if the Bank of Canada responds with higher interest rates (as it will if above-target inflation persists), Canadians will be punished further with higher interest costs, on top of sky-high gasoline prices and faster broader inflation.

The current oil price shock, just the latest in an ongoing pattern of global price volatility, confirms that fossil fuel prices are the greatest threat to affordability and living standards for Canadian workers and consumers. Please follow the Centre for Future Work’s False Profits project for more details on the impact of oil prices on prices, real wages, and inequality in Canada.

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New Research Shows National Cild Care Plan Already Driving Economic Benefits In Ontario

Jim Stanford — Tue, 28 Jul 2026 04:33:57 +0000

The Centre for Future Work has co-published new research quantifying the economic and fiscal benefits being generated in Ontario from the new Canada Wide Early Learning and Child Care program.

The expansion of affordable child care services in Ontario resulting from that new program has delivered a substantial economic boost to the province. That boost would have been even stronger, if the provincial government had not lagged behind other provinces in implementing the new national program.

The report finds that Ontario’s GDP in 2024 was $13.6 Billion higher than it would have been without the expansion of child care since 2019.

That growth in GDP generated approximately $2.25 Billion in extra provincial revenue in 2024 alone. This amount slightly exceeded the provincial funding to child care that year, indicating the program effectively pays for itself through increased economic activity.

Job Creation: Over 17,000 new jobs have been created in Ontario’s child care sector since 2019, with total sector compensation expected to exceed $3 Billion in 2026.

Empowering Women in the Workforce: Core-age (25-54) female labour force participation in Ontario increased by two full percentage points between 2019 and 2026—outpacing the national trend. This shift, combined with more women moving from part-time to full-time work, added 81,500 full-time-equivalent workers to the provincial economy.

Improved Job Quality: Average weekly earnings for child care workers rose by 39% since 2019, while average weekly hours increased from 26 to 31.

“Affordable, quality child care services are a vital precondition for economic progress,” says Jim Stanford, author of the report and Director of the Centre for Future Work.

“The data confirm that even Ontario’s partial and inconsistent rollout of the national program has been an economic boon. However, the province is leaving billions of dollars in potential growth on the table by failing to meet its targets for new spaces and lower fees”.

The report comes as the Ford and Carney governments continue to negotiate a new child care agreement.

Despite economic gains, the report highlights significant concerns regarding the Ontario government’s commitment to the Canada-Wide Early Learning and Child Care program. Ontario’s current child care agreement is set to expire in March 2027, and Ontario remains 25% behind its target for creating new spaces for children under six. Furthermore, while the national goal is $10aDay, daily CWELCC fees in Ontario currently average $19 with a cap of $22. The report also criticizes the province’s heavy reliance on for-profit providers—accounting for 44% of full-day spaces—which research associates with lower quality of care and higher staff turnover.

The report was co-published with the Ontario Coalition for Better Child Care and the Association of Early Childhood Educators Ontario.

The report concludes with urgent recommendations for the Ontario government, including securing long-term funding through 2031, eliminating “child care deserts,” and fulfilling the $10aDay affordability promise.

“If Ontario fails to fully commit to a universal system, these historic economic gains will be squandered,” added Stanford.

Please see the full report here, and a one-page summary of its key findings.

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Senate Testimony on the Canadian Economic Outlook

Jim Stanford — Tue, 16 Jun 2026 18:21:12 +0000

Centre for Future Work Economist and Director Jim Stanford was recently invited to testify before the Senate of Canada’s National Finance committee, regarding the economic and fiscal outlook for the country. The testimony was part of the committee’s hearings regarding certain aspects of budget implementation (including measures announced in the recent Spring Economics and Fiscal Update).

Below are Stanford’s opening remarks. He touched on several issues, including the need to diversify the product composition of Canada’s exports in the wake of Donald Trump’s tariffs, issues related to the proposed new Sovereign Wealth Fund announced by Prime Minister Carney, and the macroeconomic and distributional impacts of the latest spike in global oil prices (resulting from the U.S. attacks on Iran). Questions to Stanford from committee members included the sovereign wealth fund, the risks of privatizing airports and other public assets, and the challenges facing the auto industry. A Hansard record of the full hearing is available here.

Opening Remarks Senate Standing Committee on National Finance Bill C-30 Hearings, May 27, 2026

By Jim Stanford, Economist and Director Centre for Future Work

Thank you very much, Senators, for the opportunity to meet and share my views on Canada’s economic and fiscal situation as you discuss issues related to the federal budget.

The Centre for Future Work is a labour economics research institute, founded in Canada in 2020. We conduct research on the full range of economic issues facing working people: including the future of jobs, wages and income distribution, skills and training, sector and industry policies, globalization, the role of government, public services, and more. The Centre also develops timely and practical policy proposals to help make the world of work better for working people and their families. The Centre is independent and non-partisan.

Today I will present short comments on three economic issues of relevance to implementation of measures announced in the spring fiscal update, and related processes:

Diversifying Trade, Composition as Well as Destination: Donald Trump’s tariff policies and other trade attacks have posed a historic threat to Canada’s export industries. Most vulnerable are the higher-tech value-added industries that have been deliberately targeted by his Section 232 sectoral tariffs: including auto, steel, aluminum, and forestry. Further sectoral tariffs are possible given other investigations he has launched, including on aerospace, industrial machinery, semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals. Diversifying the end destination of our exports is a logical response to this challenge, and the federal government has pursued several opportunities in this regard. But there is another, equally important priority that must also be kept in mind as we traverse this challenge: diversifying the composition of our exports. In other words, what we sell is just as important as where we sell it. Canada has had some initial success in growing exports to other markets. By the fourth quarter of 2025, only two-thirds of our merchandise exports were to the U.S., down from three-quarters only a few years ago. That progress is fragile, however, dependent on cyclically high prices for gold, oil, and some other resource projects. At the same time, Canada’s dependence on exports of unprocessed or barely processed resource products – or ‘staples’, as they are often known in Canadian economic history – has been growing. Basic resources accounted for half of Canada’s merchandise exports last year, up from one-fifth at the turn of the century. Revering to a pure resource supplier – a ‘hewer of wood, drawer of water’ in the classic phrase – will not protect Canada’s economic sovereignty. We must preserve the capability to produce a full range of goods and services, including higher-technology value-added products. This goal should be front and centre in Canada’s emerging industrial policy strategy for responding to the threat from the U.S.

Sovereign Wealth and the Public Interest: Concurrent with the spring fiscal update, Prime Minister Carney recently announced his government’s intention to create a new sovereign wealth fund, that would invest in various projects with the intent of stimulating desired new economic activity, strengthening the structure of Canada’s economy, and accumulating public wealth over time. This is an interesting proposal with both opportunities and risks. Successful examples of sovereign wealth funds exist around the world. In general, the goal is not solely to accumulate and invest budgetary surpluses; most sovereign funds have a mandate to wield public capital in the interests of economic diversification or the qualitative development of the domestic economy. On that score, the fact that Canada’s fund is likely to be initially endowed with borrowed funds (rather than accumulated budget surpluses, which do not exist right now at the federal level) is not the critical issue. However, it will be important to correctly specify the mandate and governance structure of the new fund. In my judgment, the goal should be to foster investment and growth in strategic value-added industries that add to the breadth of capabilities of the Canadian economy, and help to address the composition challenge I mentioned above. I am worried by Mr. Carney’s reference to ‘asset recycling’ in his initial discussion of the idea, through which the government would potentially sell of existing public assets (reportedly including airports and ports) in order to subsidize other projects. This is a dangerous model that risks undermining the public interest in continued ownership of those vital assets. The goal is not to ‘recycle’ public wealth, but to build it over time (and enhance our economic capacities in so doing), and the new sovereign fund should be structured and managed with those public interests as its top priority.

The Latest Oil Price Shock: An already uncertain macroeconomic environment has been further disrupted by Donald Trump’s attack on Iran, the resulting closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and a global shock in oil prices. This will have negative effects on Canada, even though we are a major net exporter of oil and import virtually no oil from the Persian Gulf. Our Centre recently published a report estimating the impact of this oil shock on consumer costs and future inflation, based in part on the documented experience of the last oil shock (in 2022, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine). We considered three broad scenarios: one in which the Strait reopens immediately, one in which it remains closed for three more months, and one in which it remains closed for six more months. In any of these cases, supply disruptions and high prices will last for months after the Strait reopens, due to delays in loading and transporting shipments from the Persian Gulf, damage to export infrastructure from the war, and lasting shifts in expectations and risk premiums built into world prices. Even with immediate reopening, Canadian consumers would pay an additional $50 billion in direct and indirect costs over a 12-month period starting with the outbreak of the war at the end of February. The inflation rate would rise above 4 percent. If the Strait remains closed for longer, those costs escalate, and inflation could rise to 6 percent or higher. In turn, that will lead to higher interest rates and slower growth – on top of the existing weakness in Canada’s economy from the trade war. This disruption is the last thing Canada needs right now, and in my view it highlights important policy considerations. Having core energy prices in Canada set on the basis of volatile fluctuations in global futures markets, with no connection to Canadian production, supply, and demand conditions, exposes us to unnecessary risks. We should have a conversation in Canada about other ways to manage petroleum prices (noting that we already regulate electricity prices and gas distribution charges, which have remained stable despite the global oil chaos), and other ways to manage inflation (rather than relying solely on across-the-board interest rate hikes to suppress inflation of any kind, no matter its cause). I would also support fiscal measures to redistribute some of the record revenues that are now flowing to the petroleum industry as a result of this latest price shock – and which partly reflect excess costs paid by Canadian consumers. An excess profit tax, modeled on the one applied to Canadian banks and insurance companies during the pandemic, could recapture some of that revenue windfall, and use it to finance rebates to Canadian consumers and investments in renewable energy infrastructure (which are ultimately the best way to disengage from the volatility of world oil fluctuations). Bill C-30 includes measures to reduce federal excise taxes on gasoline and diesel in response to this price shock; asking the petroleum industry to contribute to the cost of that relief seems both fair and efficient. The full report which I reference, titled ‘A Sequel We Don’t Want: What the 2026 Oil Price Shock Will Cost Canadians,’ is available at www.centreforfuturework.ca.

Thank you again for your attention, and I look forward to any questions or discussion.

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A Sequel We Don’t Want: What the 2026 Oil Price Shock Will Cost Canadians.

Jim Stanford — Mon, 18 May 2026 06:59:33 +0000

The war in the Persian Gulf has caused the biggest disruption in oil supply in world history, and is driving up costs and inflation around the world – including in Canada.

New research from the Centre for Future Work, published through the False Profits project, shows how damaging this latest oil shock will be for affordability and inflation in Canada. It also proposes policies to protect consumers and workers.

The numbers are grim: The report predicts $50 billion in additional consumer costs over a 12-month period, and inflation jumping to 4.2%, even if the conflict ended and the Strait of Hormuz reopens tomorrow.

If the Strait remains closed for longer, the impacts on consumers will be much worse. Three months of additional closure would double the hit to Canadian consumers (to $100 billion), and push Canadian inflation to 6.9%.

The study also estimates the windfall revenue gains flowing to Canada’s petroleum industry from the war. Upstream oil revenue will soar by $65 billion over 12 months, even if the Strait reopens immediately. Under a longer closure, the industry’s revenue would increase by up to $155 billion, reaching almost $400 billion in total over the 12-month period.

The report advocates measures to stabilize oil prices within Canada (since Canada produces almost three times as much oil as it consumes, and production costs at home are unaffected by the Persian Gulf conflict), redistribute record petroleum profits back to consumers, and accelerate the transition to renewable energy sources.

Please see the full report, A Sequel We Don’t Want: What the 2026 Oil Price Shock Will Cost Canadians.

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Annotated Bibliography on the Net Employment Benefits of the Energy Transition

Jim Stanford — Thu, 23 Apr 2026 17:11:57 +0000

Compiled by Jim Stanford

Investments in sustainable energy and energy conservation are larger than investments in fossil fuel energy systems. Moreover, the work involved is more labour-intensive than fossil fuel projects (which have very small labour inputs relative to the scale of capital investments or GDP). For both reasons, the shift from fossil fuels to sustainable alternatives will definitely create far more jobs than are lost in fossil fuel industries as the economy transitions to net-zero.

This is a summary of previous research on the net employment benefits of sustainable energy projects, and other dimensions of the energy transition. It reviews several studies of the employment impacts of renewable energy and related investments in Canada, and then several international reports on parallel trends in the global economy.

Previous Canadian Studies

In a report for the Pembina Institute, Kaddoura et al. (2020) forecast potential new employment in four areas of emissions-reducing investment in Alberta, over a ten-year period. The report estimated that over 67,000 new jobs would be created in the province over a decade, driven by investments in four broad areas: renewable electricity generation, public transit and electric vehicle infrastructure, energy efficiency improvements in buildings and industry, and a program of remediation and methane reduction in oil and gas extraction facilities. That is enough new employment to offset two-thirds of all jobs in the province’s existing petroleum industry.
In neighbouring B.C., Lee and Klein (2020) estimated the employment impacts of investing 2% of provincial GDP in renewable energy and energy conservation initiatives (as proposed by Nicholas Stern in his landmark international report, 2006). They projected an investment programme of this scale would create and maintain 42,000 jobs in the provincial economy – far more than are presently supported by fossil fuel industries in that province. Due to the higher labour content of alternative energy and related products, shifting investment from fossil fuel production to renewable energy, energy efficiency, and decarbonized transportation systems generates net employment growth.
Another provincial-focused study was published by the Ecology Action Centre (2019) for Nova Scotia. This research simulated the employment impacts of a programme to reduce provincial GHG emissions by 50% by 2030, in line with Canada’s Paris Agreement commitments. Investments in renewable energy generation, energy efficiency, and public transit would support the creation of 15,000 net new jobs in Nova Scotia – and thousands more spin-off jobs elsewhere in Canada. The province would benefit from expanded GDP growth, enhanced tax revenue, and $675 million in additional annual personal income (measured in real 2019 dollar terms).
A project initiated by the David Suzuki Foundation modeled the investment and technological dimensions of an ambitious effort to expand and decarbonize Canada’s electricity system, through the rapid deployment of renewable power sources and conversion of heating, transportation, and industrial energy uses to electric power (Thomas and Green, 2022). The report also estimated the employment effects of this investment programme, which would achieve a net-zero electricity system by 2035. The analysis considered only direct construction and operation jobs associated with economy-wide electrification; it did not include indirect (upstream) or induced (downstream) spin-off jobs (such as jobs in manufacturing activities spurred by electrification), nor jobs in other emerging technologies (such as battery storage). In this regard, the forecast is very conservative. The report expects about 75,000 new jobs related to electricity generation and infrastructure to be created over the first 15 years of investment. Proportionately, the largest job growth is experienced in Alberta and Saskatchewan, where the GDP and employment gains from electrification are especially significant.
Jobs for Tomorrow (Bridge and Gilbert, 2017), focused on the impacts of the energy transition for employment among building and construction trades. That report catalogued likely investments across three broad categories of emissions-reduction activity: renewable energy generation and transmission; building energy efficiency and district energy systems; and transportation. It then estimated employment impacts of those projects on the basis of previously published employment coefficients. Across those three categories of activity, the report projected that a total of 3.3 million person-years of employment would be created in construction trades by 2050. Two-thirds of that growth was concentrated in non-residential construction (as builders updated existing structures, and built new ones, to incorporate rigorous new energy efficiency standards). Clearly, the massive investments required to facilitate the energy transition in Canada and meet international emissions-reduction commitments imply very strong ongoing demand for construction trades work.
A sequel to that 2017 report, now titled Jobs for Today, updated those projections of construction jobs arising from major investments in renewable energy systems, energy conservation, and sustainable transportation (Bridge and Stanford, 2025). This report surveyed evidence on the impacts of sustainable energy investments that are already visible on Canadian labour markets. Then it forecast the scale of investment spending that would be required to meet Canada’s official net-zero commitments in three broad areas: the full range of non-emitting energy systems (hydro, solar, wind, geothermal, nuclear, and tidal) and associated transmission investments; investments in energy-efficient buildings and community infrastructure (including new super-efficient industrial, commercial, and institutional buildings, retrofits of existing buildings, and energy-conserving district energy systems), and investments in sustainable transportation systems (including EV charging networks, urban public transit, and high-speed inter-city rail). The application of employment coefficients derived from official economic data and other published data can then translate those investment forecasts into employment projections. These investments are forecast to support the creation of 6.3 million to 9.5 million jobs years of work for construction and building trades workers – equivalent to an average of 235,000 to 350,000 new jobs on average over the next 25 years. The estimates do not include indirect or spin-off jobs in supply chains or associated manufacturing.
A deeper dive into the impacts of the energy transition for one specific trade – electricians – was undertaken by Electricity Human Resources Canada (2023). This report compiled estimates of new jobs arising from the expansion of renewable energy generation, along with transmission expansion and upgrades. The shift to renewable energy and electrification will accelerate demand for electricians considerably. The report projects net job growth of 12,000 positions in the five years ending in 2028. That is on top of the need to replace over 15,000 anticipated electrician retirements in the same period. There is no doubt that electricians are an occupation with increasing employment opportunities in coming years. The report urged additional investments in training and apprenticeships by employers and governments.
Another specific construction trade that will experience new job opportunities from the growing focus on energy conservation is insulators. Calvert and Crabtree (2022) and Calvert (2023) relate the experience of Local 131 of the insulators’ union (in New Brunswick), which pro-actively undertook an independent program of free energy audits for owners of commercial and industrial buildings. The goal was to highlight for building owners the operational and cost savings from upgraded insulation and energy conservation upgrades. The campaign was successful and generated significant amounts of new work for members of the union. Other insulator union locals have also launched industry awareness programs to promote energy retrofits, similarly generating new work opportunities for union members (Calvert and Tallon, 2016; Calvert, 2019).
The positive employment effects of electrification were further explored in a report by the David Suzuki Foundation (Thomas and Green, 2022). This report mapped the investments required to support deep electrification of Canada’s economy, on the strength of massive investments in renewable energy generation, transmission, distribution and storage facilities. To decarbonize existing electricity generation (by 2035, as per existing federal standards), and then meet the extra demand for electricity from the spread of emissions-free technologies in other sectors (such as transportation and heating), an 18-fold increase in total wind and solar generation will be needed by 2050. Some 1.5 million person-years of work will be created in the construction, operation, and maintenance of new wind and solar generating capacity, and associated battery storage. The implications of this ambitious electrification strategy for carbon emissions are hopeful: this plan would reduce emissions by a cumulative total of 3.2 billion tonnes in the period to 2050.
Clean Energy Canada has published successive reports estimating employment growth in what it calls Canada’s “clean energy economy” (Clean Energy Canada, 2019, 2021; Navius Research, 2019). The research estimated that as of 2020 some 430,000 jobs already existed in a broadly-defined clean energy sector: including renewable energy production and distribution, construction and retrofit of energy efficient buildings, clean energy transportation, and specialized clean energy industries (such as low-carbon machinery, and emission detection and control). That was an increase of over 130,000 jobs (or over one-third) from 2017. And under the climate policy outlook adopted by the federal government, clean energy jobs were forecast to grow by another 200,000 positions by 2030 – outweighing a projected decline in fossil fuel-related employment of 125,000 positions over the same time. Clean Energy Canada’s modeling confirms net gains in employment from the transition to clean energy will be experienced in all parts of Canada, including in fossil fuel-producing provinces.
A separate report prepared for Clean Energy Canada by Dunsky Energy Consulting (2018) considered the macroeconomic and employment effects from energy efficiency improvements, as mandated in the previous federal-provincial Pan Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change. The Dunsky modeling traces several channels of impact from the energy efficiency provisions of that federal-provincial agreement: including energy efficiency standards in new buildings, retrofits of existing buildings, new energy efficiency standards in appliances and equipment, and industrial energy efficiency. Those efficiency improvements were expected to meet 25% of Canada’s Paris commitments for emissions reduction. The economic stimulus from energy efficiency comes from two major channels: increased demand for efficiency-related goods and services (including building construction and retrofit), and reallocated savings on energy costs by consumers and businesses (which redeploy their energy savings into other forms of expenditure). Those effects more than offset the reduced economic activity associated with energy production resulting from reduced demand for the energy. The jobs impact of the efficiency improvements was estimated at an average net gain in ongoing employment of 118,000 over a 13-year period (to 2030), and a 1% increase in national GDP over the baseline trajectory.
Xuereb and Hillel (2023) simulated the employment impacts of an ambitious programme of proposed investment in a range of energy transition and conservation initiatives, worth a cumulative total of $287 billion over five years. (The details of this investment programme are described in Lee et al., 2023.) Based on an allocation of investment spending across different components of activity associated with each project category, this research estimated that investments on this scale would support between 187,000 and 226,000 new jobs by the fifth year of the programme. The ‘low’ estimate includes only direct and supply-chain jobs associated with the new investments; the ‘high’ estimate includes downstream jobs in consumer industries, stimulated by the increased incomes (and hence consumer spending) generated in the renewable energy and related industries.
Researchers at RBC mapped the intersectoral employment transitions and associated skills and training requirements resulting from the shift to a net-zero economy in Canada (Guldimann and Powell, 2022). Like other research, this study projected enormous job-creation potential in clean energy, infrastructure, energy conservation, and related fields. The study forecasts between 235,000 and 400,000 new jobs will be created in occupations whose tasks and qualifications have changed because of the energy transition. That total job-creation would be even larger if Canada stepped up its investments in new energy systems; the report estimates $60 billion per year in incremental capital spending estimated is necessary to meet climate targets. New work in these evolving and emerging occupations will substantially outweigh the gradual decline in employment in traditional fossil fuel energy production and use. RBC expects existing skills shortages for construction, managerial, technical, and manufacturing workers to become even more pressing as the energy transition gathers pace, and these net new jobs are created. The report calls for urgent action by governments, employers, and educators to prepare for the coming surge in demand for skilled workers in fields related to sustainable energy.
The Centre for Future Work developed a detailed breakdown of the various channels through which employment adjustments can be facilitated during a gradual phase-out of fossil fuel production and use, and corresponding ramp up of renewable energy and energy conservation projects (Stanford, 2021). In this forecast, a gradual phase-out of direct fossil fuel-related employment (estimated at 159,000 jobs across Canada in 2019, or 0.9% of total employment) would be possible over a 20- or 25-year phase-out (consistent with reaching net-zero targets by 2050), with no involuntary layoffs. Much of this transition would be facilitated through retirements, since workers in fossil fuel industries are older than the economy-wide average. New jobs created in renewable energy and other sustainable activities (including amelioration of former fossil fuel production sites) would be important in smoothing the transition. But there are many other pathways through which fossil fuel jobs could also be replaced, including through job-creation in other sectors (such as construction, non-fossil minerals, transportation, and private and public services). Supports for the roughly 4000 non-retiring fossil fuel workers who would need redeployment each year (according to that phase-out timeline) could include income insurance programs, retraining supports, relocation incentives, and small business start-up grants. Successful transition plans in other examples of fossil fuel phase-out (including Germany’s gradual shut-down of black coal mining, or Ontario’s phase-out of coal-fired electricity) prove that gradual, supported transitions of this sort can be accomplished without lay-offs, so long as timelines are long and gradual, and affected workers are supported with a portfolio of adjustment supports.

International Research

All countries are grappling with the economic and labour market issues related to the energy transition, and there is now a large body of international research attesting to the powerful employment-creating effects of major renewable energy and emissions-reduction investments. Here we summarize a few of the more notable international research efforts:

The International Energy Agency (2021) has developed a detailed global forecast of employment opportunities generated by worldwide investments to meet commitments to net-zero emissions by 2050. These investments will involve trillions of dollars of new capital spending on renewable energy systems, transmission facilities, energy conservation, and related construction work. These investments would create 30 million new jobs globally by 2030: 14 million positions in clean energy systems, and 16 million in construction and retrofit work. That will far more than offset the 5 million jobs expected to disappear from the fossil fuel sector over the same period, as fossil energy is gradually phased out. The IEA forecast does not include new jobs in related manufacturing activity, nor the spillover employment (through upstream supply chains and downstream consumer industries) spurred by these enormous investments.
Annual research has been published for a decade by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), documenting the steady growth of global employment in renewable energy activities. Its most recent report (2023) tallies 13.7 million renewable energy jobs worldwide in 2022, up 8% from the previous year – and almost double the number 10 years earlier (in IRENA’s first report). Two-thirds of those jobs are in Asia, and over 40% are in China alone (which leads the world in new solar and wind installations). The biggest single sector for renewable energy employment is solar photovoltaic power investments, supporting 4.9 million jobs worldwide in 2022. But the employment benefits of renewable energy are widespread across several other sectors, including wind, hydro, bioenergy, geothermal, and heat pumps. The IRENA tally does not include jobs in energy conservation or upgrading work, nor jobs in manufacturing renewable energy equipment. IRENA’s research highlights especially strong job-creation potential in decentralized projects, such as small-scale hydropower and decentralized solar installations.
A project to catalogue the global employment benefits from renewable energy and emissions-reduction investments in five case-study countries was undertaken by the United Nations International Development Organization and the Global Green Growth Initiative (2015). This project estimated the macroeconomic and employment effects of an investment programme worth 1.5% of national GDP in Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, South Africa, and South Korea. The investment was divided between renewable energy projects and energy conservation and emissions reduction projects. The employment impacts of these investments considerably outweighed employment declines associated with fossil fuel production. The employment benefits of energy transition investments were greater in developing countries (due to lower wage levels and greater labour-intensity of production methods). Final employment created for each $1 million (U.S.) of investment ranged from 9.5 in Germany to over 100 in Indonesia.
An especially ambitious modeling exercise was undertaken by Jacobson et al. (2017) to simulate a road-map for steep emission reduction (consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees C) in 139 countries by 2050. The research first compiled a plan for the scale and composition of investments required to achieve such emissions reduction. It then estimated the combined employment effects of those investments, across all 139 countries included in the project, on the basis of employment coefficients for specific types of investment spending and energy production. It anticipated a total of 52 million new jobs to be created by those investments over the period to 2050, almost double the 27 million jobs expected to disappear from fossil fuel production and use over the same period.
A team at the University of Massachusetts Amherst has developed a template methodology for estimating the employment gains from green energy investment plans in various U.S. states, and nationally. One recent application of that template is reported by Pollin et al. (2023), describing the estimated employment impacts of three major energy-related initiatives of the Biden administration: the Bipartisan Infrastructure Legislation, the Inflation Reduction Act, and the CHIPS Act (Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors). Applying employment input coefficients across all industries affected by the various measures in that Act, and capturing indirect (supply chain) and induced (consumer spending) effects, the research predicted an average of 2.9 million new jobs over the first five years of the measures. The construction sector alone was expected to add almost one-half million new jobs under the combined effect of the three bills.
The C40 network of mayors of major global cities (C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, 2021) modeled the employment impacts from a proposed major green investment programme for 96 cities around the world – recognizing that large urban centres face particular challenges and opportunities in transitioning to renewable energy. Their green recovery scenario sees over 50 million net new jobs created in those city regions by 2030, powered by capital investments in renewable energy systems, urban transit, conservation and building retrofits, and other emissions reduction projects. Each $1 million U.S. in green capital spending supports 10 to 21 job-years of new employment – considerably more than conventional carbon-intensive projects and energy systems. The faster the commitment to renewable energy investments, the larger are the job benefits: in an accelerated green investment scenario (which would speed up capital spending by 2 years), some 80 million net new jobs are created in the 96 cities in the same time frame. As a case study, the C40 work also featured a focused analysis of investment and employment opportunities arising from the energy transition in Canada (Berensson et al., 2021). Their analysis forecast up to 1.8 million new person-years of employment in Canada arising between 2020 and 2030 from a major emissions-reduction investment scheme in 12 large cities, including construction, manufacturing, and operating and maintenance roles. Building construction and retrofits accounted for over half of that total.
A group of researchers (Batinit et al., 2022) conducted simulations of the impacts of investments in a variety of carbon-neutral or carbon-sink projects – ranging from non-emitting power generation to environmental reclamation. Including indirect effects through supply chains, and induced impacts on downstream consumer spending, these projects generated strong multiplier effects, ranging from 1.1 to 1.7. Multiplier effects consistently larger than one indicate that each dollar invested in one of these projects, generates a final magnified impact on total economic output (and hence on employment), larger than the size of the initial investment. In contrast, fossil fuel investment projects have total multiplier effects less than one: ranging from 0.4 to 0.7. Climate-friendly investments thus generate more than twice as much final economic output as fossil fuel projects, per dollar invested.
Very similar results were generated by another macroeconomic study (Shah and Wu, 2025) comparing investments in both renewable energy and energy efficiency measures, with traditional non-eco-friendly investment projects. In this study, as well, renewable energy and energy efficiency projects generate multiplier effects consistently greater than one in the medium-term, indicating that the final impact on GDP is larger than the amount initially invested. The multiplier impacts were somewhat stronger for energy conservation initiatives (such as building retrofits), ranging up to 1.3, than for renewable energy projects (1.0-1.1). Investments in fossil fuel projects and other non-eco-friendly investments were much lower than one (in the rang of 0.3 in the medium-term), reflecting their low labour intensity.

References

Batini, Nicoletta, Mario Di Serio, Matteo Fragetta, Giovanni Melina, and Anthony Waldron (2022). “Building back better: How big are green spending multipliers?,” Ecological Economics 193, March.

Berensson, Markus, et al. (2021). Canada: The Case for an Urban Green and Just Recovery, Technical Report(London: C40 Cities), https://www.greenpolicyplatform.org/sites/default/files/C40%20Cities%20(2021)%20Canada%20-%20The%20case%20for%20an%20urban%20green%20and%20just%20recovery%20(Technical%20report).pdf.

Bridge, Tyee, and Jim Stanford (2025). Jobs for Today: Canada’s Building Trades and the Net-Zero Transition, Centre for Civic Governance, https://ccg.eco/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Jobs_for_Today_Report.pdf.

C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group (2021), The Case for a Green and Just Recovery (London: C40 Cities), https://c40.my.salesforce.com/sfc/p/#36000001Enhz/a/1Q000000gRCH/24OgSbRwj1hZ305yJbyPMZJQKhXXWNYE8k8sr2ADsi8

Clean Energy Canada (2019). Missing the Bigger Picture (Vancouver: Clean Energy Canada), https://cleanenergycanada.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Report_TER2019_CleanJobs_20190516_v3_ForWeb_FINAL.pdf.

Clean Energy Canada (2021). The New Reality (Vancouver: Clean Energy Canada), https://cleanenergycanada.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Report_CEC_CleanJobs2021.pdf.

Dunsky Energy Consulting (2018). The Economic Impact of Improved Energy Efficiency in Canada: Employment and Other Economic Outcomes from the Pan-Canadian Framework’s Energy Efficiency Measures (Montreal: Dunsky Energy Consulting), https://cleanenergycanada.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/TechnicalReport_EnergyEfficiency_20180403_FINAL.pdf.

Ecology Action Centre (2019). Nova Scotia Environmental Goals and Sustainable Prosperity Act: Economic Costs and Benefits for Proposed Goals (Halifax: Ecology Action Centre), https://ecologyaction.ca/sites/default/files/2022-06/EAC_GP_Climate%20Jobs%20Report_Sept2019_0.pdf

Guldimann, Colin, and Naomi Powell (2022). Green Collar Jobs: The skills revolution Canada needs to reach Net Zero (Toronto: RBC Canada), https://thoughtleadership.rbc.com/green-collar-jobs-the-skills-revolution-canada-needs-to-reach-net-zero/.

International Energy Agency (2021). Net Zero by 2050 (Paris: International Energy Agency), https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/deebef5d-0c34-4539-9d0c-10b13d840027/NetZeroby2050-ARoadmapfortheGlobalEnergySector_CORR.pdf.

International Renewable Energy Agency (2023). Renewable Energy and Jobs Annual Review 2023 (Abu Dhabi: IRENA), https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2023/Sep/IRENA_Renewable_energy_and_jobs_2023.pdf.

Jacobson, Mark Z., et al. (2017). “100% Clean and Renewable Wind, Water, and Sunlight All-Sector Energy Roadmaps for 139 Countries of the World,” Joule 1(1), pp. 108-121, Supplementary Tables Available at https://ars.els-cdn.com/content/image/1-s2.0-S2542435117300120-mmc1.pdf.

Kaddoura, Saeed, et al. (2020). Alberta’s Emerging Economy: A Blueprint for Job Creation through 2030(Calgary: Pembina Institute), https://www.pembina.org/reports/albertas-emerging-economy.pdf.

Lee, Marc, and Seth Klein (2020). Winding Down BC’s Fossil Fuel Industries: Planning for Climate Justice in a Zero-Carbon Economy (Vancovuer: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives), https://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/BC%20Office/2020/03/ccpa-bc_Winding-Down-BCs-Fossil-Fuel-Industries.pdf.

Lee, Marc, Caroline Brouillette, and Hadrian Mertins-Kirkwood (2023). Spending What it Takes: Transformational Climate Investments for Long-Term Prosperity in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives), https://policyalternatives.ca/publications/reports/spending-what-it-takes.

Navius Research (2019). Quantifying Canada’s Clean Energy Economy: An Assessment of Clean Energy Investment, Value-Added and Jobs (Vancouver, Navius Research), https://cleanenergycanada.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/2019-03-13-Clean-Energy-Economy-FINAL-REPORT.pdf.

Shah, Syed Sadaqat Ali, and Kai Wu (2025). “How effective are green spending multipliers? Eco-friendly vs non-eco-friendly spending in OECD economies,” Energy Policy 204, September.

Stanford, Jim (2021). Employment Transitions and the Phase-Out of Fossil Fuels, (Vancouver: Centre for Future Work), 113 pp., https://centreforfuturework.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Employment-Transitions-Report-Final.pdf.

Thomas, Stephen, and Tom Green (2022). Shifting Power: Zero-Emissions Electricity Across Canada by 2035(Vancouver: David Suzuki Foundation), https://davidsuzuki.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Shifting-Power-Zero-Emissions-Across-Canada-By-2035-Report.pdf.

United Nations International Development Organization and the Global Green Growth Initiative (2015). Global Green Growth: Clean Energy Industry Investments and Expanding Job Opportunities (Vienna: UNIDO), https://gggi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2015-06-Global-Green-Growth-Clean-Energy-Industrial-Investments-and-Expanding-Job-Opportunities-Overall-findings.pdf.

Xuereb, Slias, and Inez Hillel (2023). Job Creation Through Transformational Climate Investments: Assessing the Impact of Proposed Climate Investments in Canada (Ottawa: Vivic Research), https://vivicresearch.ca/work/employment-impacts-of-spending-what-it-takes

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Symposium on Promising Practices in Scholar-Union Collaboration: Lessons for Building Effective Research Partnerships

Jim Stanford — Wed, 22 Apr 2026 01:15:07 +0000

Academics and trade unions can do great research together, to the benefit of both sides. This special symposium of articles discusses how to do it right.

Promising Practices in Scholar-Union Collaboration

The symposium is published open-access in the leading Canadian journal Relations Industrielles / Industrial Relations. It contains 2 parts:

The 2025 JD Woods lecture presented by Centre for Future Work Director Jim Stanford at the 2025 meetings of the Canadian Industrial Relations Association.
Three case studies of excellent union-scholar collaboration, presented at a panel organized at the 2025 conference of the Canadian Association of Work and Labour Studies.

The symposium explores ingredients of sustained, productive, respectful scholar-union collaborations: including transparency, ethics, respect for constraints each side faces, and recognition that workers and their unions are a vulnerable community (not ‘lab rats’ to be studied).

The productive and mutual collaborations covered in the case studies are:

Pat Armstrong (York University) and Michael Hurley (Ontario Council of Hospital Unions/CUPE): years of joint research on conditions for health workers.
Sean Tucker (University of Regina) and Kevin Bittman (Unifor Local 594) on sustained research on the struggles of refinery workers.
Johanna Weststar (Western University) and Jakin Vela, PhD (International Game Developers Association, IGDA) on union organizing in non-standard employment.

These three collaborations all embody the mutual, respectful trust- and relationship-building that is vital to successful, productive, ethical joint research.

This symposium will be a lasting resource for both grad students & young scholars seeking to build experience and contacts in the field of trade union studies, and for trade unionists wondering how evidence-based research from IR scholars could strengthen their campaigns.

Many thanks to all those scholars for using their resources & knowledge to help empower the unions they study. Many thanks to all those unionists for making space for this important joint research. And many thanks to Fred Wilson for co-sponsoring the whole project.

Please see the full symposium here.

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Youth Unemployment: The Canary in the Coal Mine

Jim Stanford — Mon, 02 Feb 2026 06:38:19 +0000

A version of this commentary was originally published at rabble.ca.

Unemployment has remained stubbornly high in Canada, made worse by the consequences of Donald Trump’s tariffs and the lingering effects of high interest rates. As always, young people bear the heaviest burden of a weakening labour market. They are the last hired, and first fired – and hence rising unemployment is a danger sign of labour market turbulence ahead. Last summer had the highest unemployment among returning students since the turn of the century (save the COVID pandemic), and the coming summer job season shows no signs of substantial improvement.

As of end-2025, there were some 420,000 unemployed workers in Canada under age 25, and they faced an average unemployment rate of 13.3%. The 25-29 age cohort can also be defined as ‘youth’; there were almost 200,000 of them unemployed at year’s end. That makes a total of over 600,000 unemployed people under 30, for a combined unemployment rate of about 10%. Unemployment is worst for the youngest workers: 18% for those under 20.

That youngest age cohort (15-19) has also seen the biggest increase in the unemployment rate in the last two years. In addition, the participation rate for all youth cohorts has also dropped somewhat (again, especially for the youngest workers). Without that drop in labour force participation, the official youth unemployment rate would be even higher. Unemployment is worse for young men than for young women.

Conventionally measured youth unemployment (15-24) is typically around twice as high as average unemployment, and the relationship between the two did not substantially change in recent years: youth unemployment has been very high, but rose in step (2 points up for every 1 point rise in the national average rate) with the broader weakening of the labour market.

For that reason, a central focus of the solution to youth unemployment must be a commitment to reduce allunemployment – rather than imagining ways to essentially ‘redistribute’ unemployment, by helping more young people to get hired in the context of a labour market that remains underutilized. Strategies to strengthen overall job-creation include: stronger private and public investment, stronger support for public and caring services, industrial policy to strengthen Canada’s value-added industries, and shifting the emphasis of monetary policy to prioritize job-creation along with inflation-control.

This commitment to full employment at the macroeconomic level can be usefully supplemented by particular targeted supports for young workers. Examples of these measures could include expanded summer and post-graduation job programs, stronger on-the-job and apprenticeship training programs (with direct links to post-graduate job opportunities), and experiential working and learning opportunities (such as Canada’s Katimavik program, or the proposed Youth Climate Corps) that give young people both new skills and general life experience.

There are some strategies for sharing the burden of unemployment that could indeed help young workers who might otherwise be laid off, but in ways that are fair for older workers, too. Work-sharing programs in workplaces hit by downsizing help to preserve overall headcounts (and avoid the main burden of layoffs falling on young workers with less seniority). Early retirement incentives can encourage older workers to voluntarily leave work during a downturn (again preserving employment for young workers with less seniority).

Additional measures can improve pay and income security in jobs disproportionately filled by young people. This would include a commitment to higher minimum wages (since a large share of minimum wage workers are youth), and better regulation of non-standard employment arrangements (such as gig and platform work, where young workers are also disproportionately concentrated).

The general economic well-being of young people can be further improved with other measures such as lower costs for essential services that are used intensively by youth (like tuition fees and public transit), and a comprehensive strategy for addressing Canada’s housing crisis (young people have been hardest hit by the unaffordability of home ownership and especially rents).

A far-reaching proposal in this vein could include a basic income for young people (perhaps 18-25), that would provide baseline income supports to avoid poverty and facilitate young people to undertake education, start businesses, and successfully launch their working lives. Together with the existing Canada Child Benefit, the Guaranteed Income Supplement for low-income seniors, and the new Canada Disability Benefit, this would represent an important incremental step in creating a basic income floor for all Canadians.

Research has shown a ‘scarring’ effect for young workers who start their careers during a downturn, reducing their lifetime earnings trajectories by as much as 10% over their careers. That represents a lifetime loss (in real 2026 dollar terms of almost one-quarter million dollars! This income reduction results from both lost income during the initial years of unemployment, but more importantly from the reduced trajectory of earnings gains over a young worker’s subsequent years of work.

Centre for Future Work Economist and Director Jim Stanford recently spoke on the youth unemployment crisis, and how to support young workers, to the ‘Elbows Up T.O.’ assembly, organized by former Toronto Mayor John Sewell. A video of the full event is available through the ‘Elbows Up T.O.’ website.

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